




CONSTRUCTIVE DIYERSITY IN MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA
Globalisation and the Sovereignty of the Nation-State
Under the impact of economic, political and cultural globalisation one could expect 
that the whole world would tend to become more and more culturally homogeneo- 
us until a convergence of cultures eventuated. Such homogenizing forces have 
impinged upon nation-states causing them to lose some of their traditional omni- 
potence and charisma. The rising significance of international organisations has 
eroded some of the states’ powers, as has the increasing acceptance of dual citi- 
zenship and the rising tide of migratory flows across the globe.
Even a country such as Australia, which was formerly proud of its ability 
to control immigration inflow by carefully classifying immigrants as ‘skilled’, ‘fa- 
mily reunion’, ‘refugees’ and ‘humanitarian need’ cases is now in the forefront of 
debate on how to deal with asylum seekers who arrive without official papers by 
boat, by air or inside cargo containers. The ‘Ulegał’ migration flow has become 
a major problem, with controversial ‘solutions’ ranging from compulsory deten- 
tion, the ‘Pacific’ option, and the foreshadowed excision of all islands North of the 
coast of Australia from the immigration zone.
The mass arrival of illegal immigrants places the state in a dilemma of ba- 
lancing humanitarian concems against the discharge of its function as regulatory 
authority in upholding the sovereignty of the State. As the Australian Prime Mini­
ster, John Howard (2001a: 11), has put it, “there is a concern inside the Govem- 
ment...that we are fast reaching a stage where we are losing... our absolute rights to 
decide who comes to this country.” Subseąuently, he asserted that it was “in the 
national interest that we have the power to prevent, beyond any argument, people 
infringing the sovereignty of this country...” (Howard, 2001b: 1). But just as the 
Australian Govemment was moving to protect its ‘sovereignty’ by tightening the 
laws goveming the processing of asylum seekers, the Afghan crisis led it to re-
spond to the appeals of the Secretary General of UN by lifting the humanitarian 
component of Australia’s immigration program to 12,000.
The doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state has been dra- 
matically undermined as a result of the events of September 11. The American 
doctrine on this point has been succinctly stated by William Safire (2000: p. 8) who 
wrote that, the emergence of terrorism as a global threat has forced nation-states to 
adopt a new view of sovereignty. If a governing body cannot stop terrorists who 
are victimizing others from its territory, then governments of the victims will reach 
across the borders to do the necessary stopping. [According to] George Schulz, 
former Secretary of State ... “we reserve, within the framework of our right to self- 
defence, the right to preempt terrorist threats within a state’s borders”.
The weakening authority of the nation-state in the face of such crises has pa- 
radoxically generated yet another kind of force that counteract the homogenising 
effects of globalisation. As control slips out of its grasp, the state faces the rising 
demands of its local, regional and various other minority groups which are gaining 
confidence and demanding their ‘place in the sun’. We are witnessing round the 
world a renaissance, a resurgence, of a great variety of cultural diversities, inclu- 
ding that of ethnicity. While political boundaries are tending to become more per- 
meable, especially in places like Western Europę (Dogan, 2000), cultural bounda­
ries are becoming accentuated within countries (Davies, 1997; Huntington, 1996). 
In this context, it is manifest that the cultural and political boundaries between 
states do not necessarily coincide and that very few countries in the world today are 
culturally homogeneous: most are multi-ethnic.
Ethnic Diversity and the Nation-State
Different countries have responded in different ways to this ethnic challenge. Not 
every state recognises its growing cultural and ethnic diversity. Some have for long 
tried to deny its existence, as in the case of the Turks. Some hoped that their plura- 
lity was only temporary, as in the case of Germans. In fact, Germany has for long 
provided an example of a country where membership of the nation has been based 
traditionally on the assumption of common descent, and, therefore until very re- 
cently, people of non-German ancestry had no entry to the nation, and hence, no 
ready access to citizenship of the state, which has been virtually ‘closed’ to those 
who did not satisfy the German origin criterion. There are countries in Asia which 
share a similar belief in the ideał of monocultural nation-state based on common 
descent.
In other countries multi-ethnicity has lead to territorial separatism, including 
the building of walls perceived as the only altemative to terrorists attacks, insur- 
gency and warfare. In still other cases there has been no separation, but every effort 
has been made to assimilate the minorities out of existence. This policy continues 
to mark the French state’s approach to its historie regions, as well as to its new 
immigrant groups. In contrast to the Germans, the French nation-state is ‘open’, in
the sense that it has been possible to gain entry to the French state through naturali- 
sation, as many North Africans have already shown. Once one enters the French 
state, one is assumed to have become part of the French nation, and hence required 
to assimilate totally to French culture. The official French assumption is that ad- 
mission to French citizenship should virtually automatically bring with it the obli- 
teration of the new citizen’s original culture, even if does not necessarily translate 
into his/her social acceptance or job market equality. France is by no means the 
only country which believes in the ‘republican ideał’ that eąuality can best be 
achieved in a culturally homogenous society in which all cultural alternatives have 
been all but eliminated. There are Asian countries which also share similar beliefs, 
without necessarily being republics.
As the American political scientist, Safran, (1995: 2) has asserted, in the 
world today, most states “cannot cope ‘neatly’ with ethnic reality short of dispo- 
sing of it by expulsion, extermination, ghettoisation, forceable assimilation and 
other methods now widely considered to be oppresive, undemocratic, or at least 
‘inelegant’”. Safran maintains that there is a consensus about the existence of eth­
nic pluralist dilemmas and the danger which they may pose to the stability of the 
state -  “but there is consensus about little else”. Against this background, Australia 
has gradually evolved into a society that espouses its own special brand of multi- 
culturalism. The present day Australian nation-state is very different from both its 
‘closed’, descent-based and ‘open’, yet assimilative, counterparts. When viewed in 
this context, the controversy surrounding the current procedures adopted towards 
the ‘illegal immigrants’ should not be allowed to obscure the many positive and 
successful features of the Australian multicultural model.
Australia and Assimilation
As it celebrates the centenary of its federation, Australia finds itself a great distance 
from the image of the ‘founding fathers’ of the nation who drafted its constitution 
in 1901. The ideology of the newly emerging state was somewhat like that of Ger­
many, in the assumption of its homogenous British character. In fact, ‘real’ Au- 
stralians regarded themselves as some kind of regional Britons. A former Prime 
Minister and one of the founders of Australian Federation, Alfred Deakin, was 
described by Paul Kelly (1999) in the “Great Australians” series as “having correc- 
tly grasped the character of the new nation as that of Australian-Britons”.
The assumed purity of the ancestral stock was preserved (not always suc- 
cessfully) by a discriminatory migration policy. The Aboriginal people, who were 
basically “out of sight, out of mind”, were deemed to be disappearing or assimila- 
ting, partly through the policy of removing children of mixed descent. Thus, while 
in 1788, the year of European settlement, Aborigines constituted 100% of the po- 
pulation, this proportion declined rapidly to 13% in 1861, and down to 0.8% in 
1947. This decline was eventually arrested, with the numbers stabilizing at 1% by 
1981, and rising (through increased identification, as well as natural growth) to
I.5% by 1986 and 2% in 1996 (Price, 1989: 62; Hugo, 2001: 134, 197) and 2.3 % 
according to the most recent census estimates.
After the Second World War came the massive immigration of Eastern Eu- 
ropeans, such as Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, then 
Northern Europeans, mainly Dutch and Germans, and later the immigrants from 
Southern Europę, followed by Lebanese and Vietnamese, South Americans, and 
still later by Bosnians and Timorese and many other groups. Under the impact of 
such an inflow of diverse peoples, it became impossible to regard the Australian 
population as originating solely from British stock. While at the end of World War
II, only 10% of the population were bom overseas (mostly in Britain), by 1999, 
24% were overseas born. And the composition of the new arrivals also altered 
dramatically. While in 1947, 81% of the settlers came from English speaking co­
untries, by 1999 only 39% came from this source. During the 1960’s Britain still 
supplied 51% of the settlers, with others coming mainly from Greece, Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Germany and Malta. By 1990’s no more than 12% came from Britain 
itself, with the other main source countries being New Zealand, China (including 
Hong Kong), Vietnam, Philippines, South Africa and the countries of former 
Yugoslavia. The ‘migrant’ naturę of the Australian population (“the greatest mi­
grant nation in the world” according to former Prime Minister Robert Hawke) is 
also shown by the fact that as many as 27% of persons born in Australia had at 
least one parent bom overseas, so that, when taken together, these first and second 
generation migrant Australians now account for one half of the population (51%) 
(Trewin, 2001: 153).
Initially, this multitude of peoples were expected to conform to the country’s 
assimilation policy. If all the people could not be of British stock, then they should 
at least behave like British-Australians. This supposition was built on the idea that 
all cultures, other than British, were to be abandoned. People of other backgrounds 
would have their former cultures thoroughly washed out of them. Such cultural 
assimilation did not necessarily herald structural assimilation (either at primary or 
secondary level), sińce the individual’s loss of native culture did not guarantee 
social or occupational acceptance; certainly not in the case of Aboriginal people, 
and often not of other “New Australians” either.
The policy of assimilation did not prove a great success. Some people did not 
wish to assimilate, and clung tenaciously to their cultures and languages. Others 
could not assimilate because they were unable to ‘disappear’ and sink into oblivion 
within the ‘mainstream’. They possessed various physical, linguistic and cultural 
markers that prevented their total absorption. The most sustained effort made to 
assimilate these ‘cultural others’ was through their children’s schooling. The scho- 
ol became the agency o f  assimilation by excluding from the curriculum all materiał 
which did not conform to Anglo-conformist norms (the assumed ‘normality’ of this 
process was still so strongly entrenched that my use of this term in an article enti- 
tled “Is the Australian School an Assimilation Agency?”, delivered at the Univer- 
sity of Western Australia in January 1970 and first published in 1971, drew a lot of 
surprise and criticism at the time). The assimilation process was carried further
through the devaluation of other cultures and languages. The school not only chose 
to withhold any information about Polish, Greek or Italian or Chinese cultures but 
was often derogatory towards the teaching of those cultures and languages which 
the children received from ‘ethnic schools’ run by the immigrant communities out 
of school hours, and from their own meagre resources.
There is an accumulation of research data which show the difficulties expe- 
rienced by ‘migrant children’ as they tried to balance out their parents’ emphasis 
on maintaining the language and culture of the ‘home’ country and the school’s 
policy of uncompromising enforcement of the mainstream Anglo-Australian ways 
(Clyne, 1991; Smolicz, 1999). Although many of the cultural groups began to 
shrink under the impact of the assimilationist pressures (Clyne and Kipp, 1997), 
there was also a growing resistance to assimilation and refusal to disappear into the 
Anglo-dominated mainstream (Smolicz and Secombe, 1989).
Emergence of A ustralian M ulticulturalism
In the era of assimilation, Australian policy resembled that of present day France, 
in that it upheld the principles of a political democracy for all those granted perma- 
nent residence. The new arrivals were encouraged to apply for citizenship, and 
gained civic equity by becoming part of the electorate in a parliamentary democra­
cy. But there was no cultural equity. This began to change over the 1970s with the 
gradual adoption of the policy of multiculturalism (Smolicz, 1997). These changes 
were precipitated by the 1967 referendum which gave the Aboriginal population 
fuli civic rights, and brought the Aboriginal issue onto the agenda. Multicultura­
lism arrived through the work of the Fraser govemment, following its initial advo- 
cacy by Grassby in the Whitlam government. The arrival, in 1972, of substantial 
numbers of Asian immigrants, mainly Vietnamese, finally broke the White Austra­
lia Policy, the barrier that hindered the fuli implementation of multicultural policy 
in Australia.
The Australian conceptualization of multiculturalism has assumed the exi- 
stence of an over-arching framework of shared values within which different cultu­
res co-existed and interacted with one another. The various ethnic groups were 
permitted, even encouraged, to activate their own core cultural values, provided 
they were within the framework of shared values, such as political democracy, rule 
of law, market economy and English as a shared language.
Debate still persists, however, about the degree of change that the framework 
can sustain. Interpretations have varied according to the degree of multiculturalism 
that the people concemed have been prepared to accept. Some have perceived the 
shared cultural framework to be essentially dynamie in its capacity to adjust to 
existing, as well as futurę, complexities in the population. They have pointed to the 
fact that the framework has already proved its flexibility through the belated politi­
cal incorporation of Aboriginal-Australians, and the abolition of the White Austra­
lian Policy, sealed by the acceptance of the Yietnamese refugees (Jupp, 2001),
even if much remains to be achieved in the sphere of ‘reconciliation’ between the 
descendants of immigrants and the indigenous population. ‘Multicultural sceptics’, 
afraid of fragmentation, have argued for a much more limited notion of plurality 
and have preferred the framework to be grounded almost totally in Anglo-Celtic 
core values (Bullivant, 1981; Blainey, 1984). Minority cultures were then expected 
to contribute only peripherally, chiefly in relation to food and the celebration of 
colorful customs and festivals. In spite of such doubts, the multicultural model has 
been sustained and officially affirmed by formal resolutions passed in the Houses 
of Parliament and by statements of the former Governor-General of Australia (De- 
ane, 1997) who stated:
Australia’s multiculturalism sustains the nation. It both protects and pro- 
motes respect and tolerance for the backgrounds of all Australians -  for people 
who came from Britain as much as those whose origins were in other parts of the 
world.
A ustralian C ultural Diversity
In its current form, multiculturalism recognises the reality of cultural differences, 
exemplified by the fact that Australians are not all of one ancestry or all of the sa­
me religion. While people of British descent are still in a elear majority, there is 
a growing recognition of the presence of the indigenous inhabitants and the inere- 
asing proportion of Australians of non-British, and particularly Asian backgrounds.
Charles Price (1989: 62) has calculated the ‘ethnic strength’ of Australian 
population according to descent or ancestry. The overall proportion of British de­
scent has declined from 90% in 1947 to 75% in 1987 and 70% in 1999 (approxi- 
mately 45% English, 15% Irish and under 10% Scottish, with smaller proportions 
of Welsh and Cornish). At the same time the proportion of other Europeans went 
up from 7.5% in 1947 to over 18% in 1999, while ‘Asian’ inereased from 0.3% to 
6.4%, with an additional 2.5% of West Asian (Middle Eastern) origin (Hugo, 2001: 
181). The Asian ethnic strength has grown under the impact of an inereased num- 
ber of Asian-bom new arrivals which has fluctuated markedly, peaking over 1988- 
1989 (55,700) and 1990-1991 (60,900). In 1998-1999, 21,800 settlers (26% of the 
total) arrived from Asia. [It is of interest to note that during the same time the 
number of long-term visitor arrivals from Asia has also been inereasing, with some 
72% of them being students. Their number reached 53,500 in 1998, or 45% of the 
total arrivals, nine times as high as in 1978-79 and three times as high as in 1988- 
1989 (Trewin, 2001:151).]
The change in ancestry is paralleled by a greater diversification of Austra­
lians’ religious beliefs, with the adherents of Anglican Church falling from 40% of 
the proportion in 1901 to 22% in 1996, while Catholics inereased their proportion 
from 23% to 27%. Over the last twenty years there has also been a growth of non- 
Christian religions (3.5% in 1996), with Hinduism inereasing by 55%, Buddhism 
by 43% and Islam by 36%. The most remarkable, however, has been the growth of
those who stated that they had no religion (from 0.4% in 1901 to 17% in 1996) or 
those who indicated no affiliation with any religion (an increase from 2% to 9%in 
the same period). Overall almost one ąuarter of the current population are not affi- 
liated with any religion, showing the growing secularisation and diversification of 
the Australian people.
Diversity of ancestry and religion is matched by Australia’s linguistic plura- 
lism. English became dominant colonial language from the time of European set- 
tlement in 1788, when it was implanted upon an Aboriginal society which was 
itself multilingual. It has been estimated that before European settlement there exi- 
sted some 250 Australian indigenous languages, as well as some 600 dialects. By
1900, about 100,000 Indigenous people still spoke their own language, but by 
1996, there remained no more than 44,000 people (14% of the total Aboriginal 
population) who spoke either an Australian indigenous language or an Australian 
creole (a language derived from pidgin English). Multicultural policies have altered 
the climate of values in Australia, making it much more positive to preserving in­
digenous languages, with 48 of them listed in the 1996 census. The downward slide 
in the use of these ‘Languages of Australia’ (a term currently preferred by the Indi­
genous Australians) has not been arrested, however, so that even one of the most 
widely spoken language, Arrente, had no more than 3,500 speakers in 1996.
While no data on language use were collected until 1976, information on ‘ra­
ce and nationality’ suggests that Chinese languages and German were the most 
commonly spoken immigrant languages other than English before federation in
1901. A number of private Lutheran schools, with German as the language of in- 
struction, were established over the 19th century, but these were either closed down 
or obliged to change to English at the time of World War I in 1915 (Selleck, 1980; 
Clyne, 1985). There was rapid expansion in the number of languages spoken in 
Australia following the massive European and Asian migration after World War II. 
It was not until end of 1970’s, however, that most State parliaments repealed laws 
that forbade the use of languages other than English as medium of instruction in 
non-government schools. In 1996 about 2.5 million people (16% of the population 
five years and over) spoke a language other than English at home (an increase from 
14% in 1986). In all, over 200 languages were spoken with the leading five, Italian, 
Greek, Chinese, Arabie and Vietnamese, each having over 100,000 speakers. These 
“languages other than English” (LOTE), are mainly spoken by first generation 
Australians (ie those bom overseas) (74%), while 26% are Australian-bom spea­
kers, showing a tendency to maintain LOTE over more than one generation.
Acceptance of multiculturalism as the official policy has enabled Australia to 
take the lead and become one of the first countries to launch a National Policy on 
Languages. Recognizing that different ethnic identities are often rooted in their 
specific languages, the Lo Bianco Report (1987) proposed that the education sys­
tem should provide for students to leam English and at least one other language, 
which could be either a minority ethnic language, often labelled as “community 
language other than English”, or a foreign language. Under this policy, students at 
school would be encouraged, and in some states even reąuired, to study a language
other than English (in South Australia up to year 10 from 2007). Minority young 
people were thus being given the opportunity to participate in the mainstream of 
Australian life, while acąuiring literacy in other tongues, some of which they alre- 
ady spoke in their homes, but which they could also use in businesses in Australia 
and with trading partners overseas. This approach has given rise to a more positive 
image o f Australian bilinguals in the role of cultural bridges that can link different 
communities within Australia with those overseas, thus conferring important eco- 
nomic as well as socio-cultural benefits upon the country. Such possibilities have 
put paid to objections about the continued existence of languages other than En­
glish on the ground that they would supplant English. In fact, research evidence 
points to the fact that English has been accepted unquestioningly as the shared 
language for all Australians, with over 80% of LOTE speakers claiming to know 
English “well” or “very well” in the 1996 census (Trewin, 2001:165).
Constructive Diversity in a M ulticultural Nation-State
By rejecting both the German- and French-type monistic nation-state models, Au­
stralia has embraced a level constructive diversity, involving political and cultural 
co-existence, whereby people are accepted from different backgrounds on their 
own cultural terms. One of the indications of the sustainability of Australian multi­
culturalism has been the extent to which Australian citizens can at present retain 
aspects of their non-British cultural heritage and descent and be accepted as fully 
Australian, i.e, as authentic members of the Australian nation and state.
One issue which has been causing some concem is the fact that there are 
certain British ‘markers’ which have been almost invariably accepted as simply 
‘normal’, whereas markers from other origins have tended to be used as labels that 
single out and differentiate minorities. An obvious one is that of physical appe- 
arance. Apprehension has long persisted as to the danger that Australians of Abori­
ginal or Asian origin, for example, could be subject to racial labelling or even di- 
scrimination.
There is also the danger of other forms of discrimination which are not based 
on physical appearance but may exist on the grounds of difference in culture, lan­
guage, religion, family structure, the clothes wom, or the food eaten. In the post- 
world war II period incidents were reported conceming, for example, the difficul- 
ties experienced at school by children of Southern or Eastern European background 
on account of such apparently innocuous items as the “smelly” lunches which they 
brought to school. A number of adults have recalled how, as children, they threw 
their lunches in the bin, despite their mother’s efforts to give the ‘best’ their home 
cultures taught them. This was in response to other children making them feel as- 
hamed of being different. Although those are stories from the past assimilationist 
era, there still lingers a degree of sensitivity about ‘labelling’ on the grounds of 
culture, which can be referred to as cultural racism, ethnicism or linguism.
The danger of such possible pitfalls has become more widely understood in 
Australia, with the education system devising programs that demonstrate to the 
students that, in order to survive and develop as a nation along multicultural lines, 
the Country needs more than the common political machinery of the democratic 
state. It requires also the cultivation and sustained growth of cultural values that 
extend beyond political structures and not only reflect the majority group’s values, 
but also take account of the minority groups’ aspirations to maintain their cultural 
identity, as exemplified what we have termed their core values (Smolicz, 1981; 
Smolicz&Secombe, 1989; Smolicz, Hudson & Secombe, 1998).
Different ethnic groups exhibit a diverse rangę of values which they regard 
as essential fo r  their continuity and integrity. Because of their strong identification 
with their native tongue, some groups can be viewed as particularly language- 
centered, sińce the loss of their language endangers their cultural vitality. As 
a conseąuence, such groups can become culturally ‘residualized’ and lose their 
powers of creativity and development. Polish, Greek, French and Baltic groups can 
be regarded as belonging to this category. Others are more clearly linked to reli- 
gion, as in the particular case of Malays’ allegiance to Islam, so that its loss endan­
gers the individuals’ membership of the group concerned. Other cultures are cente- 
red around family or elan structure and the concem to perpetuate the group’s 
descent. Some groups are fortunate in having a multiple set o f  core values, for 
example, an ethno-specific language, religion and a supporting collectivist family 
structure to maintain their identity (Smolicz, Secombe and Hudson, 2001).
The recognition of the significance of cultural core values for various groups 
does not imply a tendency to promote their separatism within the state. On the 
contrary, the maintenance of such values in a multicultural Australian setting is 
built upon the principle of constructive diversity that is based upon cultural inte- 
raction among the groups, involving an exchange process, rather than simply one 
way traffic favouring one group to the detriment of another. Such a dynamie pro­
cess, which proceeds through a degree of cultural synthesis, diffusion and co- 
existence, takes place within the framework o f the shared overarching values to 
which all groups are entitled to make their particular contribution. Minority gro­
ups have then no need to fear the loss of their essential cultural elements. In this 
way one of insidious forces that could drive them toward separatism is being eli- 
minated, sińce groups concerned cease to have any inclination towards isolationism 
and fragmentation.
Australian Multiculturalism and the Becalming of Ancient Group Animosities
The mutual confidence in a sustainable multicultural structure has lead to inereased 
trust and cooperation not only between the majority group and the minorities but 
also the minority groups themselves, some of whom derive from countries where 
they existed in a state of conflict, tension and mutual hostility. In a number of in- 
stances multicultural Australia has succeeded in removing the “sting” from among
peoples and their descendents who in their original homelands were known to 
dwell in a state of mutual animosity or even open conflict. Many members of these 
groups have reached a point of accommodation within the Australian multicultural 
context. A number of the mutually antagonistic neighbouring peoples in Europę, 
Asia and Africa, such as Poles and Germans; Greeks and Slavonic-speaking Mace- 
donians; Vietnamese and Chinese; Eritreans and Ethiopians have succeeded in 
interacting within Australian ethnic and multicultural councils and federations 
(such as the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils (FECCA)) and to coope- 
rate across ethnic divisions. One of the factors working for this acomodation is the 
security, respect and eąuality provided to all groups within the framework of sha­
red Australian values, sharpened by the common aim to lobby the State and Federal 
govemment to provide adequate support for their particular language and culture 
maintenance and to insure equity of access to the all-Australians institutions and 
structures.
One of the areas being researched is the Horn of Africa and the people who 
derive their origins from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Dijibouti -  coun­
tries which have been politically turbulent, economically depressed and environ- 
mentally devastated. (Debela, 1996). The peoples of these ‘disturbed’ countries are 
distinctive in their diversity and include ethnic groups that transcend national bo­
undaries, generating complex clan/ethnic affiliations, as well as differences in lan­
guages spoken, religious beliefs and political views. Refugees, settlers on special 
humanitarian grounds and, to a much smaller extent, immigrants from this area 
have formed a highly visible community in Australia. The complexity of the inte- 
ractions of these groups of settlers in South Australia, and their relationships with 
the wider Australian community have formed a fascinating study indicative of the 
process of acculturation and adjustment within the orbit of the Horn of Africa 
community as a whole. Of special interest has been the naturę of the apparent so- 
cial integration and cohesion that have developed in Australia within the mosaic of 
national, ethnic, elan and linguistic groupings from the Horn -  and all these in spite 
of decades of bloody and continuing interethnic violence in Africa. The degree to 
which many of these groups have succeeded in putting aside their historical enmi- 
ties, overcome their differences and cooperate to rebuild their life in the new coun­
try, testifies to the vitality of the phenomenon of multicultural Australia and its 
ability to moderate and heal former enmities.
This phenomenon of inter-group cohesion generated in Australia, constitutes 
still largely undocumented major theme of the Australia migration story -  a story 
of success currently overshadowed by the unfortunate experiences generated by the 
“the illegal boat migration” incidents. While Australia successes in integrating 
migrants with the majority group and with each other undoubtedly owes much to 
the relative economic wealth and prosperity of the country, there is no doubt that 
multicultural policy approach that stresses respect for the cultural values of new- 
comers and the need for social and cultural eąuality has contributed greatly to the 
emerging social consensus and political stability of the country as a whole.
From a comparative perspective, the achievement of Australia can be judged 
best on the extent to which it has been able to engage in a process of reshaping 
itself by attempting to recognise its own plurality and by demonstrating that tole- 
rance of diversity and gradually emerging pluralist policies in languages and cultu- 
re education are a better guarantee of stability than enforced rapid assimilation to 
one dominant language and culture.
An idealized multicultural model, to which Australia aspires, is free from the 
divisions that are most difficult to bridge, as when one particular religion is made 
mandatory or when racial or ancestral characteristics are regarded as exclusion 
markers that set the limits of nationhood. In order to reinforce these multicultural 
goals, Australia has established an array of anti-discriminatory State and Federal 
legislation, with an active role assigned to the ombudsmen. Such structures have 
been augmented by sustained educational efforts to propagate school curriculum 
which condemned all forms of racism, whether based upon appearance, language, 
customs or religion. Australian states have developed programs of “Countering 
Racism through Developing Cultural Understanding”, which demonstrate that 
while it will never be possible for all Australians to look alike, practise the same 
religion, live in the same type of family household or relish the same kind of food, 
all these practices need to be understood and accepted as compatible with the Au­
stralian nationhood and reąuiring the same respect and protection. The affirmation 
of this principle by successive govemments is reassuring -  always with the proviso 
that the cultural practices concerned are carried out within the Australian constitu- 
tion and legał system and within the dynamie overarching framework of shared 
values.
M ulticulturalism  and H um ań Rights
Questions have been raised about the possible existence of “essential contradic- 
tions” within multiculturalism, and whether Australia has succeeded in resolving 
them within its multicultural model. The difficulties in reconciling cultural diver- 
sity with good govemance might, for example, arise out of the paradox that a de- 
mocratic Australia generates a respect for cultural diversity coupled with the poli­
cies that assume the universality of certain fundamental values. The balance 
between these two facets of contemporary Australian society must take into acco- 
unt differences in ethnicity, religion and other aspects of culture which co-exist 
within its legał and constitutional structures which are based on belief in the 
universality and indivisibility of ‘common’ human rights. It is a dilemma, which 
extends well beyond the borders of Australia, up to the seeming contradiction be­
tween the universality of individual human rights and the diversity of cultures and 
civilizations.
In the context of Australia, Justice Michael Kirby (1998) of the High Court 
has helped towards the resolution of some these issues by insisting on the inter- 
dependence of political, economic, social, cultural and linguistic rights. He has
pointed out that Western perceptions of human rights have changed over time. For 
example, the notion of political suffrage in Western countries did not extend to 
women or to some ethnic and racial minorities until ąuite recently. What is more, 
many minority groups throughout the world, particularly those of indigenous origin 
or altemative sexuality, are still denied access to the fuli rangę of human rights. 
Kirby concluded that in the matter of human rights, “the Voyage of Discovery, 
which the United Nations’ Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (1950) initiated 
is far from complete”.
The fact that, sińce 1967, all citizens, including the Indigenous inhabitants, 
can exercise fuli political and legał rights as Australians, does not, however, on its 
own, make adeąuate recompense for the past, nor provide any acknowledgement of 
the Aboriginal people’ s uniąue cultural heritage. Only over recent years, and in the 
climate of world-wide concem with indigenous rights on the part of intemational 
organisations, has Australia become actively involved in the process of ‘Reconci- 
liation’ with Aboriginal Australians. There has been a rising consciousness of the 
need to make amends for the past appropriation of the land and destruction of so 
many aspects of indigenous culture.
For many Aboriginal people, assimilation to the point of vanishing into the 
‘mainstream’ has not been a practical proposition. What is more, some of them did 
not wish to ‘vanish’. Their lack of gratitude to the assimilation offer, which was 
extended after years of separation and domination, astounded many Australians, as 
many Aboriginal people persisted in their quest for Australianness in their own 
particular Aboriginal way, including the activation of their languages and cultural 
heritage, which directly involved their ancestral land.
The High Court rulings that legally dismantled the notion of ‘terra nullius’, 
or the view of Australia as an ‘empty’ land that Europeans could occupy and use at 
will; the refusal to extinguish Aboriginal rights to their ancestral land which was 
currently leased to pastoralists; the setting up of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission enabling Aboriginal Australians to have a voice in their own 
affairs; and finally the setting up of Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, have 
opened the way to achieving the sought for Reconciliation. Central to this process 
has been the recognition that human rights for Aboriginal Australians cannot be 
achieved without fuli appreciation of indigenous cultural heritage and tradition. In 
this sense, Reconciliation is intimately linked with the UN Universal Declaration 
o f Human Rights.
On the occasion of 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, Justice 
Kirby spoke of the need for its update, without diminishing the universality of fun- 
damental human rights that it enshrined. When applied to Australia, these are em- 
bodied in parliamentary democracy and equal civic rights for all citizens. The ack­
nowledgement by the Asia-Pacific NGO for World Conference on Human Rights 
(1992) that “universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures”, makes 
it possible to develop a model of Human Rights for Australia which links both 
Multiculturalism and Reconciliation. In the Tree Model (see diagram  1), the tree 
trunk represents the civic and political rights portrayed as the indivisible and
universal aspects of Australian democracy. The branches of the ‘tree’ illustrate the 
different cultural rights of all the diverse groups that make up Australian society, 
including Aboriginal Australians. The model shows the linkage between respect for 
religious human rights with those involving the rights to land because of the Abo­
riginal spirituality that connects the two. Similarly, it demonstrates how respect for 
the family collectivism in Aboriginal life highlights the grief currently being 
expressed by the elderly people who were victims of the policy of removing chil- 
dren of European fathers from their Aboriginal mothers and transferring them to 
orphanages or foster families.
The successful outcome of the Reconciliation process with Indigenous Au­
stralians through the recognition of their human rights, shared with all Australians 
in their civic and political aspects, while permitting diversity in their cultural mani- 
festations, has implication for Australian multiculturalism as it applies to all gro­
ups. The model demonstrates particularly well the need for flexibility and dynamie 
naturę of the overarching framework if it is to accomodate the needs of all Austra­
lians, including the Aboriginal people. Their previous exclusion has impoverished 
the nation. Their current inclusion enriches it and broadens the dimensions of per- 
mitted particularities within the framework of universal human rights.
The same type of framework could be adopted by other culturally plural co- 
untries as they strive to harmonise their cultural diversity with a stable and resilient 
nation-state that adheres to the principles of universal human rights. As the ‘Tree 
Model’ indicates, some rights are indeed indispensable in a democratic state. These 
include civic, political and cultural rights, as indicated by the ‘trunk’ in the ‘tree 
diagram’. The cultural rights, however need not conform to a single pattem, with 
the ‘crown’ of the tree assuming different configurations, depending on the cultural 
traditions of the groups that make the nation and their members’ current aspira- 
tions. The ultimate success of the Australian multicultural achievement lies in the 
fact that the various cultural branches can grow freely, while ensuring that no sin­
gle one can crowd out the others and that their development occurs harmoniously 
within an unifying and flexible framework underpinned by the UN Universal 
Declaration o f Human Rights.
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